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The United States government historically has ignored the importance of the Arctic and been late to react to changes in the region. Today, unique geographic developments and adjustments in the international political landscape are highlighting the geopolitical importance of Alaska and the Arctic Region once again. Three distinct trends have contributed to renewed interest in the Arctic: new emerging sea lanes due to climate change, increased natural resource competition, and the rise of competitors in the region. Combined, the competition for natural resources made more accessible by climate change and the political developments in the Arctic and the Pacific create a significant challenge for US policymakers. With the increased importance of the Arctic, proper identification of ends, ways and means will assist in keeping the Arctic region one of cooperation. Several recommendations are offered under the elements of national power. The rationale for a comprehensive policy review and synchronization of ways and means offered here is a starting point for a more robust national strategy on the reemerging northern front.
From the Top: Shaping America's Arctic Policy and Strategy
I believe in the future he who holds Alaska will rule the world, and I think it is the most important strategic place in the world.
-Brigadier General Billy Mitchell new emerging sea lanes due to climate change, increased natural resource competition, and the rise of competitors in the region. This paper will examine the emergence of these trends and offer recommendations for strengthening current US Arctic policy and strategy.
Definitions and Methodology
Before one can say that Alaska or the Arctic is geopolitically important, a common understanding of the terms is useful. Saul Bernard Cohen defines geopolitics as an analytical mode "relating diversity in content and scale of geographical settings to exercise of political power." 2 In other words, geopolitics is the relationship between geography (land) and political power. For the purposes of this paper, Alaska will refer to the State of Alaska and the land within its legal borders. The Arctic Research and Policy Act of 1984 (ARPA) codifies the term Arctic:
As used in this title, the term "Arctic" means all United States and foreign territory north of the Arctic Circle and all United States territory north and 2 west of the boundary formed by the Porcupine, Yukon, and Kuskokwim Rivers [in Alaska]; all contiguous seas, including the Arctic Ocean and the Beaufort, Bering, and Chukchi Seas; and the Aleutian chain. The categories of geography and political power and the interaction between them serve to illuminate both challenges and opportunities in the Arctic, and will frame an examination of the current trends.
Changing Geography
In the middle of the twentieth century, two students of geopolitics emerged who Renner expanded on the theory of Halford Mackinder that posited control of the world was to be held by whoever controlled the great Eurasian heartland. Thus, when designing their "M I Operation" for Midway and the Aleutians, Japanese planners had two operational objectives: destruction of the Pacific fleet and protection of the northern flank of the Japanese homeland. 12 For the Americans, the Japanese presence inside American territory on Attu and Kiska demanded appropriate response.
US forces did not fail in protecting national sovereignty, and ejected the Japanese in a bitter and bloody campaign. In all, more than half a million combatants from the opposing sides participated in the Aleutian campaign. It is also impossible to dispute the implications of geographic proximity. As the only campaign of World War II carried out on North American soil, had the Japanese held a more aggressive intent beyond the Aleutians, the Americans and Canadians could have been forced to focus on continental defense which had been a key concern 7 of the US Army before the war. 15 Northeast Passage, is more than a third of the current total. However, there are still challenges to be solved before a large increase in point to point shipping can be realized. First, while the northern straits are certainly opening for periods of time heretofore unseen, the exact time they will open and remain so is uncertain. Also, these newly opened waters still have floating pieces of ice, known as growlers, moving freely throughout the passages which means that ships cannot maintain the same speed navigating Arctic waters as in more temperate ones. This reduction in speed that offsets shorter distances, higher insurance fees, and additional equipment costs necessitated by transit through Arctic waters makes any near-term sustainable increase in long-haul transit problematic. More certain is that increased shipping activity in the region will be "destinational," driven by the thriving competition for natural resources. By not joining, the United States is actually giving up sovereign rights---missing an opportunity for international recognition or massive expansion of U.S. resources jurisdiction over as much as one million square kilometers of ocean, an area half the size of the Louisiana Purchase. Remaining outside the convention prevents the United States from participating in the process of overseeing the claims of other countries to the extended continental shelf and from formally making its own. 37 The US has unresolved maritime boundary disputes with Canada and Russia in the Chukchi and Bering Seas respectively. Although an agreement with Russia has been reached, the treaty has never been ratified by Russia. The Canadian dispute is ongoing.
The Department of State (DoS) is assigned as the lead executive department for participation in the Arctic Council. "The Arctic Council is a high-level intergovernmental forum to promote cooperation, coordination and interaction among the Arctic states." 
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The Arctic is primarily a maritime environment that includes the homeland (State of Alaska) and its approaches. These characteristics of the operational environment make the United States Coast Guard (USCG) one of the most capable and wellpositioned federal entities to influence Arctic strategy. However, according to USCG Commandant, Admiral Robert J. Papp, Jr., "the Arctic is emerging as the new maritime frontier, and the Coast Guard is challenged in responding to the current and emerging demands." 41 Ironically, although the Coast Guard Commandant says his service is challenged, the USCG employs the only operational icebreaker owned by the US, which places the country at a distinct disadvantage when compared with other Arctic nations.
Synchronized efforts between the USCG, belonging to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the DoD will be imperative when deciphering both legal authority issues and capability requirements.
In order to achieve the end state articulated in the QDR, the DoD has devised Arctic Mission Areas, and conducted capabilities based assessments on the ability to perform those missions in the out years. Significant shortfalls exist in several areas including: ice and weather reporting; limited intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets and capabilities; lack of ice capable vessels (neither icebreakers nor ice strengthened); and deep water port infrastructure. Despite these shortages, DoD asserts that it can meet all missions with current threats, conditions and capabilities, and that monitoring the situation in the Arctic and reacting with the right capabilities commensurate with the pace of opening of the region will suffice.
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The Arctic is currently out of the American public's spotlight, and thus, strategic messaging about the Arctic is meager. However, there are many audiences to address with strategic information themes. Currently, US actions speak clearly: the US is lagging behind other Arctic nations in both security preparations and claims to the continental shelf. This appearance must certainly be an encouraging sign to potential adversaries, and of concern to stakeholders and partners.
The long delay in ratification of UNCLOS is hampering economic claims to In strategy documents, DoD has done an admirable job identifying required capabilities, but in reality has been less anxious to pursue procurement in this resource constrained environment. The tendency to wish away capability gaps by relying on foreign partners and/or continuing to monitor threats to US interests is prevalent.
Partnering and waiting are approaches that do not support the DoD's ability to act independently or respond to a wide range of contingencies in a timely manner in accordance with the department's own objectives. 44 With long lead times for research, development, acquisition, and construction, these approaches to strategy carry considerable risk. Information operations should be explicitly synchronized with the other elements of national power. Audiences such as indigenous peoples, environmental groups, multinational corporations, Arctic partners and potential adversaries must all receive messages. The primary medium however is action. By demonstrating focus on the changes in the Arctic region, and by acting responsibly to develop capabilities and resources, the US will demonstrate a desire to work peacefully in the region and demonstrate firm resolve to protect sovereignty and national interests. Those are great message themes to reinforce.
UNCLOS will aid the economic arm of Arctic power, but diplomatic settlement of boundary disputes is equally crucial. The US should also initiate deliberate development operations for new sources of oil and natural gas, which could dramatically shift US dependence on imports. A clear path and incentives for companies to obtain leases and licenses must be promoted in order to encourage further private investment.
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Balance must be attained between environmental concerns and the advantages offered by new sources of energy.
Conclusion
Although the Arctic finds itself at the nexus of national security strategy once again, the current fiscal environment and the lack of perceived threat is significantly constraining preparation for future contingencies. The current approach of "wait and partner" entails significant risk that the US will not gain required capabilities in time to respond. A whole of government approach should be developed that is focused on a complementary strategy of using limited resources (means) in creative ways that ensure success in both the Pacific and the Arctic. Alaska, as the swinging door between the two areas of responsibility, is the perfect choice for basing of critical capabilities for both PACOM and NORTHCOM. As evidenced by history and through air power theory, the US is more than capable of projecting power from the 49 th state. Integration of the DHS and the USCG into all Arctic planning is also imperative. The Coast Guard has the legal authority for homeland security, regional expertise, and most viable capability to operate in the Arctic maritime environment today. Military focus on awareness, integrated command and control, and facilities infrastructure for the Arctic maritime environment will allow DoD and DHS to combine coherent response and defense capabilities. The rationale for a comprehensive policy review and synchronization of ways and means offered here is a starting point for a more robust national strategy on the reemerging northern front.
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